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TAXATION-FEDERAL lNcoME TAX-CONSEQUENCES TO SELLER AND BUYER
OF COVENANT NoT TO COMPETE-The owners of the entire capital stock of a
newspaper business received an offer of $1,000,000 for their stock and a
covenant not to compete with buyers for ten years. After the offer was accepted
and the contract of sale drawn up, buyer asked for a clause in the contract
evaluating the covenant not to compete at $50 a share and the stock at $150 a
share in order to help him taxwise. The clause was accepted with little discussion. The sellers reported the entire proceeds of the sale on their income
tax returns as long term capital gain, but the Commissioner ruled that $50 per
share of the proceeds constituted consideration for the covenant not to compete
and was taxable as ordinary income. The Tax Court held that since the
covenant was treated as a separate item in the negotiations, the amount received
for it was ordinary income. Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust, 19 T.C. 718 (1953).
The buyer treated $50 per share of the amount paid as a capital expenditure
for the covenant and deducted an amount representing amortization of the cost.
In this case the Commissioner argued that the agreement not to compete was
no more than an incident to the transfer of the good will of the business and
had no separable value. The Tax Court held that the covenant had a
separable value and was a depreciable capital asset. Gazette Telegraph Co.,
19 T.C. 692 (1953).
When a contract for the sale of a business is accompanied by a covenant
by the sellers not to compete1 with the buyers for a specified period, questions
arise as to the tax consequences of the transaction to both parties.2 Where the
covenant is made by a person other than the seller, e.g., a key employee or
shareholder in a small corporation, the consideration he receives is ordinary
income.8 In these cases, the payment received by the covenantor is not an
incident to a contract for sale of the covenantor's property, but compensation

1 For a discussion of the legality of covenants not to compete from the restraint of
trade point of view see Carpenter, "Validity of Contracts Not to Compete," 76 UNIV. PA.
L. REv. 244 (1928).
2 See Kamens and Ancier, ''Tax Consequences of a Covenant Not to Compete," 27
TAXES 891 (1949).
s Cox v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 987; Salvage v. Commissioner,
(2d Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 112, affd. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106, 56 S.Ct. 375
(1936); Beals' Estate v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 268.
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for refraining from work which is as much income to him as is money paid to
a person for the performance of services.4 Research discloses no decided cases
dealing with the treatment that should be accorded the consideration paid in
the covenantee's return, but it would seem that it should be regarded as a
deferred expense to be amortized over the life of the covenant if the expense
meets the ordinary and necessary requirement. The questions are more difficult
where the seller is the covenantor. The generally recognized rule is that where
good will is sold in connection with the sale of a business, the seller is precluded
from soliciting the former customers of the business sold, even though no
covenant not to compete is included in the contract for sale of the business.5
In many cases it is probable that forbearance from competition by the seller is
the substance of the good will transferred, and the inclusion of a covenant not
to compete in the contract is a superfluity or at most a mere incident to the
transfer of good will. In such cases no attempt is made to split the consideration
received by the seller into capital gain and ordinary income; the entire transaction is regarded as a capital transfer. 6 If, on the other hand, the covenant
not to compete is bargained for by the buyer as a separate item in connection
with the contract of sale, then the amount received for it is ordinary income to
the seller.7 A similar distinction must be made to determine the proper treatment by the buyer. Where the court concludes that the covenant is inseparable
from the transfer of good will, the buyer may not amortize any of the consideration paid over the life of the covenant, since good will is not a depreciable
asset.8 If the covenant is separable, the buyer may amortize its cost. In
4 "In this country, every man has the right to exercise any lawful avocation on the
same terms with his neighbor•••• If he sells his .services for wages or salary, what he
receives is income. If he refrains from exercising his skill and ability in a particular line
for a definite period, what he receives in compensation is just as much a gain and is
income." Cox v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 987 at 988.
5 This rule was laid down in England in Trego v. Hunt, [1896] A. C. 7, and is generally followed in the United States. See, e.g., Von Bremen v. MacMonnies, 200 N.Y.
41, 93 N.E. 186 (1910). Connecticut apparently refuses to give any protection to the
buyer in the absence of an express covenant. Cottrell v. Babcock Printing Press Mfg. Co.,
54 Conn. 122, 6 A. 791 (1886). In Massachusetts, "it is a question of fact whether having
regard to the character of the business sold and that set up, the new business does or does
not derogate from the grant made by that sale." Old Comer Book Store v. Upham, 194
Mass. 101 at 105, 80 N.E. 228 (1907).
6 In Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943), this result was reached even though
the contract stated a separate consideration for the covenant not to compete. A similar
result was reached in Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949), where the sole proprietor of a
laundry sold his business and agreed not to compete for £ve years.
7Jn Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949), taxpayer sold his accounting business
listing good will as a speci£c item and including in the contract a covenant not to compete
for six years. There was no allocation of the consideration in the contract. The court held
that part of the consideration was allocable to the sale of good will and part to ordinary
income as payment for the covenant not to compete.
8 "No deduction for depreciation, including obsolescence, is allowable in respect of good
will." Treas. Reg. 118, §39.230)-3. The regulation is based on the decision in Clarke v.
Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384, 50 S.Ct. 155 (1929). When the
buyer of the newspaper involved in Toledo Newspaper Co., note 6 supra, tried to amortize
the cost allocated in the covenant, the Tax Court was consistent with its former holding
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Christensen Machine Co. v. United States, 9 a corporation bought out the stock
of an inventor who was one of the two principal stockholders and secured a
covenant from him not to compete for five years. No allocation of the $60,000
consideration was made by the parties. The corporation in its tax return
allocated $30,000 to the covenant and deducted one-fifth of this amount during
the first year. This treatment of the transaction was approved by the court
since the $30,000 was viewed as purchase of a "valuable asset."10 In the
principal case, the form which the sale of the business took may be important,
•since in theory, at least, it would seem that corporate good will is attached to
the corporation itself and not the individual ownership interests. Therefore,
when the owners sell their stock there is no transfer of good will to which the
covenant not to compete can be said to be a mere incident. This is somewhat
unrealistic, of course, and the factor which the court stresses is that the parties
themselves allocated a portion of the consideration to the covenant which showed
they had dealt with it as a separate item from good will. 11 Although the
principles of law governing cases of this type are reasonably clear, the cases
illustrate the difficulties of trying to determine whether or not the covenant
was treated as a separate item by the parties in their negotiations. Since the
court in the principal case gives much weight to the recitals in the contract
as to the allocation of the consideration, the decision indicates the importance
to both buyer and seller of being aware of the possible tax consequences of
such recitals. If both are familiar with the problem, it is more likely that the
bargaining process will set a price on the covenant which reflects its true value
to both parties, and will serve as a fair basis for tax treatment.

Richard B. Barnett, S.Ed.

and refused the deduction. Toledo Blade Co.,11 T.C. 1079 (1948), affd. (6th Cir. 1950)
180 F. (2d) 357. In R. Bryson Jones, 17 B.T.A. 1213 (1929), a similar result was reached
in a case involvmg the sale of an insurance business coupled with a covenant not to compete
for 10 years. The court felt that the good will was the principal asset transferred in the
sale.
o (Ct. Cl. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 282.
Similar decisions are Black River Sand Corp., 18 B.T.A. 490 (1929), and B. T.
Babbitt, Inc., 32 B.T.A. 693 (1935).
11 "After taking into account all of the relevant facts of the transaction and considering
the whole record, we have concluded that the written contract accurately reHected the
agreement of the parties and that the agreement was reached at arm's length. In the circumstances it is not incumbent on the Court to disturb the allocation of purchase price made
by the parties themselves." 19 T.C. 718 at 724. The dissent points out that the evaluation
clause was inserted at the last moment with little discussion "to help the buyers taxwise,"
and that the sellers were unaware of the consequences to themselves of what they were
doing.
10

